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Abstract
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert that faces a conict of interest
with a decision maker is concerned about establishing a reputation for having accurate
information. In this environment, the incentive of the expert to establish a reputation
for competence has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the degree of information revelation. An
increase in reputation above a certain threshold always makes truthful revelation more
di¢ cult to achieve. This is driven by the fact that experts with greater reputation for
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ability can more easily sway the beliefs of decision makers in a desired direction. Thus,
higher levels of reputation exacerbate the incentives of biased experts to misreport
their private information. Decision makers may therefore be better o¤ consulting less
reputable experts when conicts are more pronounced.
Keywords: Experts; Reputation; Cheap Talk; Conicts of Interest; Information
Transmission.
JEL Classication: C72, D82, D83
1 Introduction
There are several economic and political settings in which an expert that is called on to
provide information to a decision maker faces an intrinsic conict of interest. In many such
cases, it is plausible to presume that the decision maker is aware of this conict, at least to
some extent. For example, many investors are likely to have a good understanding of the fact
that nancial analysts have incentives to provide biased reports.1 Similarly, in the political
arena, the electoral body is likely to know that government agencies have reasons to bias
their macroeconomic forecasts towards those that favor politicians.2 A standard argument
is that the concern of an expert about establishing a reputation for being competent should
mitigate this conict.3
The central question that we address in this paper is how reputation for ability and more
in general the perceived quality of an experts information a¤ect the communication process
1See for example Michaeli and Womack (1999) and Barber et al. (2006, 2007) showing that a¢ liated
analysts have an optimism bias resulting from their involvement in the investment banking activity of their
brokerage house.
2Weatherford (1987), Alesina and Roubini (1997) and Carlsen (1999) document that incumbent govern-
ments generally prefer agencies that are more inclined to provide optimistic forecasts. In these cases, the
conict of interest originates from the ability of the executive branch to sanction agencies that fail to act in
its interest by proposing budget cuts, disposing of executives or even advocating termination of the agency.
3See for example Mikhail et al. (1999), Hong and Kubik (2003) and Fang and Yasuda (2009) for the case
of nancial analysts. Heclo (1975), Rourke (1992), Carpenter (2001), Wilson (1989), Bendor et al. (1985)
and Banks and Weingast (1992) document the disciplining role of reputation and career concerns in the
political arena.
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in a context in which the experts bias is commonly known. We nd that in the presence of
conicts of interest, decision makers are not necessarily better o¤ when they consult more
reputable experts (i.e., experts with a better expected quality of information). Indeed, we
show that it may be optimal for a decision maker to consult a less reputable expert precisely
when incentives are less aligned.
We derive these conclusions in a model of cheap talk in which an expert privately observes
a (binary) signal about a (binary) state of the world, and subsequently makes a cheap talk
report to a decision maker.4 The accuracy of the signal depends on the ability of the expert,
which is unknown both to the expert and the decision maker. The decision maker observes
the report and updates her belief about the state. Once the state has been publicly revealed,
the decision maker uses the report to also update her belief about the ability of the expert.
To capture the presence of conicts of interest and the experts reputational concern for
ability, we assume that the payo¤ of the expert is increasing both in the decision makers
belief that the state is high and in the decision makers belief about the ability of the expert.
Thus, when deciding which report to make, the expert trades o¤ the reputational reward of
providing a correct report against the benet of using his credibility to sway the receivers
beliefs about the state in the desired direction. The payo¤ function of the expert is assumed
to be common knowledge. This implies that the decision maker is aware of the experts bias.
A distinctive feature of our model is that an increase in the level of initial reputation
has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the experts incentives to truthfully reveal his information.
In particular, beyond a certain threshold, any increase in initial reputation always increases
the experts incentives to sway the beliefs of the decision maker towards the desired (high)
state. This is in contrast with the case of no conicts of interest, where an increase in the
level of initial reputation always has a positive e¤ect on the experts incentives to truthfully
reveal his information. Intuitively, as reputation becomes su¢ ciently high, there is less scope
for reputation acquisition and reputation becomes less e¤ective in mitigating the experts
4We use male pronouns for the expert and female pronouns for the decision maker.
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bias.5 At the same time, as the reputation of an expert increases, the decision maker assigns
more weight to his advice. This in turn provides a biased expert with a higher incentive to
misreport.
Thus, when an expert has an explicit conict of interest, his incentives to misreport
increase endogenously with his level of reputation. This has two implications. First, for
higher and higher values of initial reputation, truthful revelation occurs for lower and lower
beliefs about the state of the world. This is so because when beliefs about the state of the
world are strongly pessimistic, a positive message has little e¤ect in inducing decision makers
to believe that things are actually going well, thereby attenuating the strong incentives of a
highly reputable expert to misreport. Second, ceteris paribus, the distortionary incentives
provided by reputation may induce a more reputable expert to lie when a less reputable
one does not, implying that in the presence of conicts of interest decision makers are not
necessarily better o¤when they consult more reputable experts. In particular, we show that
an increase in conicts of interest tends to exacerbate the perverse incentives of reputation.
Indeed, we nd that as the bias becomes more severe, hiring experts with greater reputation
becomes less and less convenient.
Finally, we show that in the presence of conicts of interest and reputational concerns for
ability, truthful revelation becomes possible only when public information is rather contrary
to the state towards which the expert wishes to sway the beliefs of the decision maker. For
example, in our binary model, an expert with a strong bias towards the high state will
report truthfully only when the prior probability of the high state is relatively small. This
result, which again arises from the interaction between the experts conict of interest and
his reputational concerns, suggests that a biased expert should be consulted over issues for
which public consensus is polarized around a belief that is opposite to the one that the expert
5This e¤ect is consistent with the reputational incentives identied by Holmström (1999) in a model of
e¤ort provision, where managers exert more e¤ort in the initial stages of their career, when uncertainty on
their ability is higher and the scope for reputation acquisition is greater.
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would like to induce.
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature on sender-receiver models of
information transmission. The rst strand analyzes information transmission in the case in
which sendersand receiverspreferences are misaligned (Crawford and Sobel 1982, Sobel
1985; Benabou and Laroque 1992; Morris 2001). The second deals with experts that do not
have explicit conicts of interest with decision makers and are exclusively concerned about
establishing a reputation for having accurate information (Ottaviani and Sorensen 2001,
2006; Trueman 1994).
A standard result of the rst strand is that only noisy information can be credibly trans-
mitted if the expert and the decision maker have conicting preferences. In particular, the
more biased the expert is, the noisier the information revealed (Crawford and Sobel 1982).
Starting with Sobel (1985), this literature has analyzed games of cheap-talk in which there
is uncertainty on the preferences of the expert, and the expert can establish a reputation
for being unbiased (Benabou and Laroque 1992; Morris 2001). In particular, Morris (2001)
highlights a potentially distortionary e¤ect of reputation by showing that an advisor with
preferences aligned with those of the decision maker may in fact distort his private infor-
mation in order to build a reputation for being unbiased.6 In our model, the preferences of
the expert are assumed to be common knowledge and uncertainty is about the forecasting
ability of the expert. The issue we address is whether experts with a higher reputation for
competence are more likely to credibly transmit their information when it is well known that
they are biased.
Our paper is closely related to Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001, 2006). They study infor-
mation reporting by privately informed experts who are solely motivated by the desire to be
perceived as competent, and show that honesty is impossible under very general conditions.
In their model, the amount of information that is credibly transmitted is always increasing
6Ely and Valimaki (2003) obtain a result in the spirit of Morris (2001) in a principal-agent model whitout
cheap-talk.
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in the quality of the experts information. By introducing conicts of interest in a setting
with reputation for ability, we show that greater quality of information is not necessarily
associated with less misreporting. In some respect, our work is complementary to Bourjade
and Jullien (2011) who also consider the case of a biased expert with a reputational concern
for competence, but in a setting in which the expert has hard information. They consider
strategic concealment of private information while we analyze the issue of misrepresentation
of information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the general
setup of the model. Section 3 characterizes the most informative equilibrium and analyzes the
conditions under which truthtelling is possible, highlighting the incentives that lead experts
to deviate from truthtelling. Section 4 examines the relationship between the reputation of
an expert and his credibility, and Section 5 studies how changes in the intensity of conicts
of interest a¤ect this relationship. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
An expert is called upon to provide information to a decision maker (DM) who has to make
a forecast about the state of world. The state of the world ! is either low or high, i.e.,
! 2 f0; 1g, and all players hold the same prior belief  that the state is 1. At the beginning
of the game, the expert observes a private and non-veriable signal s 2 fs0; s1g about the
true state, and its accuracy depends on the experts ability t. We assume that the expert
is either good or bad, i.e., t 2 fg; bg, and that ability a¤ects the accuracy of the signal as
follows:
Pr(s1jt = g; ! = 1) = Pr(s0jt = g; ! = 0) = p; p 2 (1=2; 1) , (1)
Pr(s1jt = b; ! = 1) = Pr(s0jt = b; ! = 0) = z; z 2 (1=2; p] . (2)
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Therefore, both expert types can count on an informative (yet imperfect) signal, with the
good type having a more accurate signal than a bad type.7 We assume that neither the
expert nor the decision maker know the experts type, and all players hold the same prior
belief  that the expert is good. We interpret  as the prior reputation for ability of the
expert.
After observing the signal, the expert chooses to release a report to the decision maker in
the form of a costless binary message m 2 fm0;m1g. The decision maker observes message
m and chooses an action x 2 R. Finally, the true state of the world is revealed and together
with the message of the expert is used by the decision maker to revise her beliefs about the
experts ability.8 We denote with b!;m  Pr(t = gj!;m), the decision makers posterior
belief that the expert is good upon observing state ! and message m. We interpret b!;m as
the new level of reputation for ability acquired by the expert at the end of the game.
The decision makers utility depends on the state of the world ! and her action x. As
is standard in the literature, we assume that the decision makers utility is given by the
quadratic loss function  (x !)2. This implies that the action that maximizes the expected
utility of the decision maker is equal to the probability she assigns to the state of the world
being 1. Given that messagem was sent by the expert with prior reputation , we denote withb;m  Pr(! = 1jm) the decision makers interim belief (i.e., prior to the realization of the
state of the world) that the state of the world is 1. Thus, in equilibrium the decision maker
optimal action is x = b;m. As we will see, in any equilibrium in which some information is
transmitted, the higher the reputation of the expert, the more the decision maker will trust
the message sent. The subscript  highlights this relationship.
To model the experts concern about establishing a reputation for being a valuable
provider of information and the contemporaneous existence of conicts of interest, we con-
7All the results also when the bad type has an uninformative signal (i.e., z = 1=2).
8As in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), the fact that the decision maker performs the task of forecasting
the experts ability can be justied by the implicit assumption that receivers are rewarded for accurately
forcasting the ability of the expert.
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struct a game where the payo¤ of the expert depends positively on the decision makers
action x as well as on the posterior belief b!;m, as follows:
(m) = kx+ (1  k)b!;m with k 2 [0; 1] . (3)
Since in equilibrium x = b;m;the experts payo¤ can be rewritten as:
(m) = kb;m + (1  k)b!;m with k 2 [0; 1] . (4)
The component b!;m captures the concern of the expert to be perceived as having accurate
information.9 The component b;m gives the expert an incentive to inate the decision
makers belief that the state is 1, and thus creates a conict of interest with the decision
maker.10 Finally, the parameter k 2 [0; 1] weighs these two components and can be seen as
a measure of the severity of conicts of interest. The structure and the parameters of the
game (with the sole exception of the experts signal) are common knowledge.11
Notice that interpreting 1 and 0 respectively as favorable and unfavorable states for the
decision maker, the model represents the over-optimism bias that has been discussed both in
the nance literature on sell side analysts and in the political science literature on government
agenciesforecasts.12 For the sake of exposition, in the remainder of the paper we will adopt
this interpretation and refer to the experts bias as to the over-optimism bias.
9This reduced form to account for reputational concerns is widely adopted in studies that model the
reputation of experts and managers (see for example Sharfstein and Stein (1990), Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2006) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)).
10Formally this game falls in the class of psychological games since the senders payo¤ depends on the
receivers belief (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009).
11It is worth noticing that since also k is common knowledge, we do not address the case in which receivers
are uncertain about the incentives of the expert. See Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), and
Morgan and Stocken (2003) for a formal analysis of the case in which there is uncertainty about the experts
preferences.
12Assuming that the expert has an interest in inating the receivers belief about the state being 1, is
without loss of generality. Our setup is well suited for analyzing a more general setting, in which the expert
has an incentive to manipulate the receivers beliefs in a desired direction.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we analyze the incentives of an expert to truthfully report his information
and characterize the most informative equilibrium.13
At the moment of sending message m, the true state of the world is unknown to the
expert. The expert uses his signal s to compute the expected impact of message m on his
reputation, as follows:
E (b!;mjs) = Pr(! = 1js)b1;m + Pr(! = 0js)b0;m:
Therefore, the expected payo¤ of the expert from sending message m reads:
E ((m)js) = kb;m + (1  k)E (b!;mjs) . (5)
Before analyzing the incentives of an expert to truthfully report his information, it is conve-
nient to gain an intuition of the tensions involved in the reporting decision. In any equilibrium
where some information is transmitted we have that b;m1 > b;m0.14 This introduces an in-
centive to report message m1 and represents a threat to truthtelling whenever signal s0 is
received. In fact, the presence of reputational concerns counterbalances this over-optimism
bias. As long as k 2 (0; 1), the expert has to trade o¤ the temptation of sending m1 with the
negative e¤ects that this message might have on his reputation in case the message turns
out to be incorrect.
The equilibrium concept we use is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The
expert will truthfully report signal s if and only if the expected payo¤ of truthtelling is
greater than the payo¤ of reporting a message that is di¤erent from the signal received.
13Our model presents the well-known problem of equilibrium multiplicity that is common to any cheap-talk
game. A babbling equilibrium where all messages are taken to be meaningless and ignored always exists.
14Since the experts signals are informative, in any equilibrium where signals are truthfully reported with
some positive probability, the messages of the expert contain some information.
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Thus, a truthtelling equilibrium exists if and only if for every s 2 fs0; s1g, E ((m = s)js) 
E ((m 6= s)js), or equivalently:
kb;m0 + (1  k)E (b!;m0 js0)  kb;m1 + (1  k)E (b!;m1js0) , (6)
kb;m1 + (1  k)E (b!;m1js1)  kb;m0 + (1  k)E (b!;m0js1) . (7)
In a truthtelling equilibrium, posterior reputation takes on only two possible values, which
we denote with  and , where:
  b0;m1 = b1;m0 , (8)
  b1;m1 = b0;m0 , (9)
with  >  > .15 Making a correct evaluation increases the experts reputation from
its initial level  to the higher level . Making a wrong evaluation decreases the experts
reputation from  to the lower level . In the rest of the paper we denote (   ) as the
reputational reward of being recognized as a good expert. This allows us to write conditions
(6) and (7) in the following way:
k
b;m1   b;m0  (1  k)(  ) (1  2Pr (! = 1js0)) , (10)
k
b;m1   b;m0  (1  k)(  ) (1  2Pr (! = 1js1)) . (11)
For each of the above conditions, we refer to the left hand side as the benet of providing a
high message, and to the right hand side as the expected reputational gain of sending a low
message. Notice that the right hand side of (10) represents the expected reputational gain
of truthtelling when receiving a low signal, while the right hand side of (11) represents the
expected reputational gain of misreporting when receiving a high signal.
15We show this result in the Appendix.
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It is straightforward to show that when reputation does not play any role (i.e., when
k = 1), condition (10) is never satised and a truthtelling equilibrium never exists. We now
establish that whenever the expert is concerned about reputation some information can be
transmitted.
Lemma 1 Independently of whether the expert faces a conict of interest (i.e., for any
k 2 [0; 1)), there always exists a non empty interval ;  ; with 0 <  <  < 1 such that the
most informative equilibrium is: (i) separating (i.e. fully revealing) for  2 ;  and (ii)
pooling (i.e. uninformative) for  =2 [; ].
(Proof: see Appendix)
When  is relatively extreme, the expert believes that any contrarian signal he receives is
likely to be incorrect. Being afraid that ex-post incorrect messages may negatively a¤ect his
reputation, he disregards his private information and reports the signal that is more likely to
be correct ex-post. This is the conservative behavior highlighted by Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2001, 2006) for the case in which the expert does not have any partisan bias and is solely
concerned about his reputation.
There is a simple reason why this behavior persists in our context with conicts of interest.
When  is very low (high), the decision maker expects the state to be 0 (1) regardless of the
message sent. As a result, the net gain from inating the beliefs of the the decision maker
by sending m1 instead of a m0 is very small (i.e., the LHSs of conditions (10) and (11) are
close to zero) and the choice of the expert is mainly driven by reputational concerns.
The previous nding highlights that when public opinion is polarized, conicts of interest
are less relevant. No matter how strong is the conict (i.e., how large is k), the bias-driven
incentives to misreport are small since the experts ability to sway the decision makers beliefs
in a desired direction is limited. As we show in sections 4 and 5, the presence of conicts of
interest is not innocuous with respect to other relevant dimensions of the problem that we
are analyzing.
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4 The E¤ects of Reputation on Credibility
In this section, we address the following question. Assuming that the decision maker could
choose among a pool of experts with di¤erent levels of reputation, would she always choose
the expert with the highest reputation? As it will soon become clear, in order to answer this




is a¤ected by a change in
prior reputation . It is useful to begin our analysis by considering the benchmark case in
which there are no conicts of interest (i.e., k = 0).





cally centered around  = 1
2
and, ceteris paribus, expands monotonically as  increases.
(Proof: see Appendix)
This result implies that a decision maker can never be worse o¤ by consulting an expert
with a higher reputation. If an expert with a certain level of reputation truthfully reveals
his information, then any expert with a higher level of reputation will also report truthfully
and will do so with a higher expected precision of his signal.
The situation is quite di¤erent in the presence of conicts of interest (i.e., k 2 (0; 1))
since a variation in prior reputation has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the credibility region.
Figure 1 compares the case of conicts of interest (left panel) with the case of no conicts of
interest (right panel). As opposed to the case without conicts, when conicts are present, a
further increase in prior reputation above a certain threshold makes the truthtelling region
shrink, and the thresholds  and  shift downwards towards lower values of . Therefore,
truthtelling holds for a smaller range of values on the state of the world, and this range of
values is skewed towards zero. An implication of this result is that for higher and higher
values of initial reputation, in order for the expert to truthfully reveal his information, it
must be less and less likely that the state of the world is high (i.e., that ! = 1). This result
is summarized in the following proposition:
12
Proposition 1 In the presence of conicts of interest, there always exist 0 <  <  < 1
such that: a) For  2 (0; ), an improvement in initial reputation  increases the truthtelling
thresholds  and , and expands the truthtelling region; b) For  2 (; 1), an improve-
ment in initial reputation  decreases the truthtelling thresholds  and , and shrinks the
truthtelling region.
(Proof: see Appendix)
To gain the intuition behind proposition 1, consider the truthtelling conditions (10) and
(11). First, note that the net benet of sending a high report, b;m1   b;m0 is increasing in
the level of prior reputation . This is so because an expert with a higher level of reputation
is expected to have more accurate signals. As a consequence, in any informative equilibrium,
the messages of this expert will have a greater impact on the decision makers beliefs about
the state. Then, note that the net reputational reward of being recognized as a good expert,
   is strictly concave in , and progressively shrinks to zero as  approaches either zero
or one. This occurs because the scope for reputation acquisition is greater, the higher the
uncertainty about the experts ability and becomes negligible when the uncertainty about
ability is very low.16 The interaction between these two e¤ects determines the way in which
a variation in  a¤ects the truthtelling region. As  increases above a certain threshold, the
net reputational reward of being recognized as a good expert (i.e.,    ) starts to shrink,
while the net benet of sending a high message (i.e., b;m1   b;m0) keeps growing larger.
Eventually, the incentives of the expert to sway the beliefs of the decision maker in favor of
the high state grow larger. In order to counter these incentives and preserve truthtelling, 
must decrease. Indeed, as the probability that the state is high gets smaller, the expected
reputational reward of sending a low message gets larger.
This e¤ect intensies as  approaches one, in which case the two thresholds  and 
approach zero and the truthtelling region progressively shrinks becoming an empty set. A
16This is consistent with Holmstrom (1999), in which the reputational incentives for an agent to provide
e¤ort are positively related to the level of uncertainty on the agents ability.
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similar reasoning suggests that an increase in  has a positive e¤ect on the size of the
truthtelling region whenever the initial level of reputation is below a certain threshold.
An important consequence of introducing conicts of interest in a setting in which ex-
perts are concerned about their reputation for ability is that consulting experts of higher
reputation is not necessarily an optimal choice for decision makers. Combining Lemma 1
and Proposition 1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose the DM could choose an expert among those with di¤erent prior
reputation  2 [0; 1]. For every prior on the state of the world  2 (0; 1), there always exists
a level of reputation 0 2 [0; 1), such that the DM would never be better o¤ by choosing an
expert with prior reputation  > 0.
(Proof: see Appendix)
Unlike in the absence of conicts of interest, the distortionary incentives provided by
reputation may induce a more reputable expert to lie when a less reputable expert would
not. This suggests that in the presence of conicts of interest, decision makers are not
necessarily better o¤ consulting more reputable experts. To see this point, consider the
following example. Assume there are two experts with reputation 0 and 1 respectively,
where 0 < 00 < 1. Suppose that the prior on the state of the world is  = (00).
The expert with high reputation has a truthtelling threshold (1) < (00) and will not
provide any information while the expert with low reputation has a truthtelling threshold
(0) > (
00) and will provide valuable information. Thus, if the prior on the state of the
world is  = (00) and the DM could choose which expert to hire, she would choose the
expert with lower reputation.
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5 Variations in Conicts of Interest
We conclude our analysis by considering how the magnitude of conicts of interest repre-
sented by k, may a¤ect the results presented in the previous section.
In order to examine the relationship between conicts of interest and the nature of the
truthtelling region, we analyze how variations in k a¤ect the truthtelling thresholds  and .
The following proposition highlights that when the prior on the state of the world is rather
pessimistic, experts with a greater conict of interest may be more likely to tell the truth
than experts with a lower bias.
Proposition 3 As conicts of interest increase, the truthtelling region shifts downwards
(i.e. both  and  are decreasing in k)
(Proof: see Appendix)
We know from remark 1 that in the absence of a bias (i.e., k = 0), the truthtelling region
is centered around  = 1
2
. Proposition 3 suggests that as conicts of interest become more
severe, the truthtelling region progressively shifts towards values of the prior on the state of
the world that are closer to zero. The reason for this result is straightforward. Suppose that
k = k0 and that the expert has received s0. We know that in this case the expert reports the




, with k0 denoting the threshold value
of  at which the expert is indi¤erent between the high and the low message. If k increases
above k0, the optimistic bias of the expert increases too, and the experts indi¤erence at k0
is broken in favour of the high message. Similarly, if the expert has received s1, he reports
the high message for values of  in the region [k0 ; 1), where k0 denotes the threshold value
of  at which the expert is indi¤erent between the high and the low message. Again, as k
increases and the experts optimistic bias becomes stronger, the indi¤erence at k0 will be
broken in favor of the high message.
In general, the previous analysis suggests that when an expert is biased, truthful rev-
elation occurs when public information is rather contrary to the state towards which the
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expert wishes to sway public opinion. Therefore, in situations in which public information
is polarized around a certain belief, consulting an expert with a contrary bias may be more
valuable than consulting an unbiased expert.
As we have seen in section 4, in the presence of conicts of interest, the distortionary
incentives provided by reputation may induce a more reputable expert to lie when a less
reputable expert would not. We now establish that an increase in conicts of interest tends
to exacerbate the perverse incentives of reputation. Indeed, as the bias becomes more severe
(i.e., as k increases), hiring experts with greater reputation becomes less and less convenient.
This result is highlighted in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 For any prior on the state of the world  such that an expert truthfully
reveals his information, an increase in k strictly reduces 0.
(Proof: see Appendix)
Decision makers may therefore be better o¤ consulting less reputable experts precisely
when incentives are less aligned. Moreover, reputation becomes less e¤ective in mitigating
conicts of interest exactly when it is more needed.
6 Conclusions
Conicts of interest are relevant in many economic settings in which an expert with privileged
information is called upon to provide information to an uninformed decision maker. In this
paper, we focused on the trade-o¤ that biased experts typically face between the short-term
benets of providing a biased report and the long-term rewards of establishing a reputation
for having accurate information.
We nd that the interaction between reputation and conicts of interest plays an im-
portant role in shaping the incentives of experts. Reputation for ability allows for some
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information transmission even when decision makers know that an expert is biased. How-
ever, reputation has a non-monotonic e¤ect on information transmission. In particular, when
the experts reputation rises above a critical threshold, the expert is more likely to misre-
port. Therefore decision makers may be better o¤ choosing experts of lower reputation. This
occurs because a report sent by an expert with an established reputation for ability, has a
greater impact on the beliefs of the decision maker. Accordingly, a highly reputable expert
has greater incentives to cash in on reputation by swaying the beliefs of decision makers in
the desired direction. Moreover, when conicts of interest are more intense, reputation is less
e¤ective in inducing experts to reveal their information. Therefore, decision makers should
consult experts with a lower reputation for ability when their preferences are less aligned.
A suggested avenue for future research is to gather further insight on the role of both
ability and preferences in jointly determining the reputation of experts. In particular, a
relevant question involves understanding in which circumstances decision makers may be
better o¤ consulting experts that have similar preferences, rather than those that have more
accurate information. Capturing how these elements may a¤ect the credibility of an expert
through the reputational channel represents an open issue.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We divide the proof of Lemma 1 into the following three Parts:










C Babbling equilibria always exist.




In a truthtelling equilibrium, the values of posterior reputation and the values of the
posterior beliefs about the state read respectively:




  for (! = 1; m = m1), (! = 0; m = m0).
(1 p)
1 q   for (! = 1; m = m0), (! = 0; m = m1).
b;m1 = Pr(! = 1js1) = qq + (1  )(1  q)b;m0 = Pr(! = 1js0) = (1  q)(1  q) + (1  )q
where q  p+ (1  )z.
These results allow us to rewrite truthtelling conditions (10) and (11) as follows:
k(1  )(2q   1)
( + q   2q) (1 + 2q      q) 
(1  k)(p  q)(q   )
q(1  q) ( + q   2q) (A1)
k(1  )(2q   1)
( + q   2q) (1 + 2q      q) 
(1  k)(p  q)(1     q)
q(1  q)(1 + 2q      q) (A2)
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Consider condition (A1). Since 1
2
 z < q < p < 1 and  2 (0; 1), we have that
 + q   2q > 0. Thus, (A1) is equivalent to:
k(1  )(2q   1)
1 + 2q      q 
(1  k)(p  q)(q   )
q(1  q) (A3)
Let l()  k(1 )(2q 1)
1+2q  q and r()  (1 k)(p q)(q )q(1 q) . Note that for every  2 (0; 1), k 2
[0; 1) ; z 2 (1
2
; p) and p 2 (z; 1):
Property (a): l(0) = 0 < r(0), l(1) = 0 > r(1);
Property (b): r() is a negatively sloped straight line;
Property (c): l() is non-negative, continuous, and strictly concave for  2 (0; 1).
Properties (a), (b) and (c) imply that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that (A3) is
satised for any  < .
Focusing on condition (A2) and following the same line of reasoning above, one can prove
that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that (A2) is satised for any  > .
We now show that  > . Note that:
Property (d): The LHSs of (A1) and (A2) have the same expression. This expression is
equal to zero at  = 0; 1. It is strictly positive and strictly concave in  for  2 (0; 1).
Property(e): The expression of the RHS of (A1) is strictly larger than the expression of
the RHS of (A2). Both expressions are strictly decreasing in .
Together with the uniqueness of  and , properties (d) and (e) imply that  > .
We conclude step A by establishing a property that we will use later, namely:
Property(f):  q.
To see that Property (f) holds, note that  is the value of  at which (A1) holds with
equality. Now note that RHS of (A1) is strictly negative for values of  strictly larger than
q. This result, together with properties (d) and (e) above, imply that equality can occur
only at a value of  smaller than or equal to q.





An informative equilibria exists as long as it satises the following two conditions:
kb;m1   kb;m0  (1  k)E (b!;m0 js0)  (1  k)E (b!;m1js0) , (A4)
kb;m1   kb;m0  (1  k)E (b!;m0 js1)  (1  k)E (b!;m1js1) (A5)
For simplicity, let us rewrite these conditions using the following short-hand notation:
LHS  RHS(s0) (A6)
LHS  RHS(s1) (A7)
Aside truthtelling, the following (mixed-strategy) informative equilibria are to be considered:
PP1: The expert truthfully reports m1 after signal s1 (RHS(s1) < LHS), while he
reports m0 with probability u0;0 and m1 with probability 1 u0;0 after signal s0 (RHS(s0) =
LHS)
PP0: The expert truthfully reports m0 after signal s0 (RHS(s0) > LHS), while he
reports m1 with probability u1;1 and m0 with probability 1   u1;1 after signal s1 (LHS =
RHS(s1)).
PP: The expert follows a mixed strategy both after s0 and s1. He reports m1 with
probability u1;1 and m0 with probability 1  u1;1 after signal s1 (RHS(s0) = LHS); and he
reports m0 with probability u0;0 and m1 with probability 1 u0;0 after signal s0 (RHS(s1) =
LHS); where u0;0 6= u1;1.
Note that since signals are informative, Pr(! = 1 j s1) > Pr(! = 1 j s0) and Pr(! =
0 j s0) > Pr(! = 0 j s1); Furthermore, whenever messages contain some information,b!=m  b! 6=m. Given this, it it follows that RHS(s0) > RHS(s1) for any  so that:
RHS(s0)  LHS > RHS(s1)  LHS for any  (A8)
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We show that none of the three equilibria above exists for  >  (a similar reasoning applies
for  < ).
We rst show that PP1 does not exist. Suppose that the expert receives s0. The
expert will follow the equilibrium strategy of sending m0 with probability u0;0 and m1 with
probability 1  u0;0 if and only if condition (A4) holds with equality, that is:
kb;m0 + (1  k)E (b!;m0js0) = kb;m1 + (1  k)E (b!;m1js0) (A9)
Calculating the equilibrium values of b;m0, b;m1 , b!;m0 and b!;m1, condition (A9) reads as
follows:
k(1  )(2q   1)
(q +    2q)(1  u0;0(q   2q + )) =
(1  k)(p  q)(1  2 + u0;0   u0;0(1  q))
(1  u0;0q)(1  u0;0(1  q))(q   2q + )
This equality can equivalently be written as:
k(1  )(2q   1)(1  u0;0q)
(1  u0;0(q   2q + )) =
(1  k)(p  q)(1  2 + u0;0   u0;0(1  q))
(1  u0;0(1  q)) (A10)
We have to show that there does not exist any u0;0 2 (0; 1) such that (A10) is satised
when  2  ; 1. Since we know from Property (f) in Step A that   q, it is convenient to
consider the following two cases:
  2 (q; 1). Note that when  2 (q; 1), the LHS of (A10) is positive, while the RHS is
strictly negative because 1 2+u u(1  q) < 0. Thus, (A10) can never be satised
for  2 (q; 1).





=   k(1  )(2q   1)
2




2k(1  )(   2q)2( + q   2q)




((1  k)(p  q)(2q   1)




2(1  k)(p  q)(1  q)(2q   1)
(1  u0;0 + qu0;0)3 > 0 for  2 (0; 1) (A14)
In words, the RHS is strictly increasing and strictly convex in u0;0 for  2 (0; 1), while
the LHS is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in u0;0 for  2 (0; q]. Properties
(A11) to (A14) imply that when  2 (0; q], if a u0;0 exists such that condition (A10)
is satised, it must be unique. Now, we know that at u0;0 = 1 (i.e. when there
is truthtelling) the following two facts hold true: a) Condition (A10) is satised for
 = ; b) The LHS of condition (A10) is strictly greater than the RHS for  2  ; q.
But then, by properties (A11) to (A14) we have that for all  2  ; q, there does not
exist any u0;0 2 (0; 1) such that (A10) can be satised.
We now show that PP0 does not exist. We have just shown that for every  >
, PP1 does not exist.. In particular, RHS(s0)   LHS < 0 By (A8), this also implies that
RHS(s1)   LHS < 0. Therefore if PP1 never exists also PP0 never exists (because PP0
requires that RHS(s1)  LHS = 0).
We nally show that PP does not exist. PP requires both (A6) and (A7) to be
satised with equality, which in turn implies that RHS(s0) = RHS(s1). This violates
condition (A8).
Part C - Babbling Equilibria always exist
We conclude the proof of lemma 1 by showing that a babbling equilibrium where the
expert sends m1 with probability  and m0 with probability 1  irrespectively of the signal
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observed always exists. In this case all messages are taken to be meaningless and ignored:b;m =  for any m 2 fm0;m1g, and b!;m =  for any ! 2 f0; 1g and m 2 fm0;m1g, making
the expert indi¤erent between the two messages.
Proof of Remark 1. When k = 0, condition (A1) boils down to 0  (p  q)(   q).
Thus, when k = 0, the upper bound of the truthtelling region is k=0 = q  p + (1  )z.
Similarly, from condition (A2), one can show that when k = 0 the lower bound of the
truthtelling region is k=0 = 1  q  1  (p+ (1  )z).
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider condition (A1) and notice that for every k 2
(0; 1), z 2 (1
2
; p) and p 2 (z; 1), the following holds true: (i) For  ! 0, LHS1 !
k(2z 1)(1 )
(2z  z)(2z  z+1) and RHS1 ! 0; thus, for  ! 0,  ! 0; (ii) For  ! 1, LHS1 !
k(2p 1)(1 )
(2p  p)(2p  p+1) and RHS1 ! 0; thus, for  ! 1 :  ! 0. Now, (i) and (ii) imply that
for  ! 0,     ! 0; A similar argument applies to condition (A2) to show that: (iii) For
! 0,  ! 0; (iv) For ! 1,  ! 0. Now, (iii) and (iv) imply that for ! 1,     ! 0.
Since     is positive for any value of  2 (0; 1), by continuity there exists a value of
 =  2 (0; 1) below which     is increasing in , and a value of  =  2 (0; 1) above
which     is decreasing in . Note that properties (i) to (iv) above imply that  > .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let (k; ; z; p) be the solution to condition (A1). Note that
Lemma 1 guarantees that (k; ; z; p) is dened for every  2 (0; 1), k 2 [0; 1), z 2 (1
2
; p),
p 2 (z; 1).
Since we are interested in changes in  while keeping all other parameters constant, for
the sake of notation, we simply write ().
By Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we know that () satises the following properties for
k 2 (0; 1) and  2 (; 1):
(a) () is continuous and strictly decreasing in ;
(b) () < 1 and (1)! 0.
For a given  2 (0; 1) ; we dene 0() as the value of  such that for every  2 (0(); 1]
23
it holds that  > ()
In order to prove the proposition we need to show that 0() 2 (0; 1) for every  2 (0; 1).
We therefore consider the following two cases:
1.  2  0; () - Properties (a) and (b) imply that for any given  2  0; () we
have that 0() 2 (; 1) :
2.  2 ((); 1) - Property (a) implies that for every  2 (; 1) we have that  > ().
This implies that 0()  .























This result is a straightforward consequence of Properties (d) and (e) in the Proof of Lemma
1 together with the existence and uniqueness of  and ,. In words, (A15) says that the
RHS of (A1) always intersects the LHS from above, and (A16) says that the same is true
for condition (A2).
Now, note that for any  2 (0; q), @LHS
@k
=   (1 )(2q 1)





(1 q)q(2q  q) < 0. Since  < q, (see Property (f) in the Proof of Lemma 1), the pre-
vious result together with (A15) and (A16) implies that  is decreasing in k. The same
reasoning applies to condition (A2) to show that  is decreasing in k.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us denote with (k; ) the solution to condition (A1).
Note that Lemma 1 guarantees that (k; ) is dened for every  2 (0; 1), k 2 [0; 1) :
By the proof of proposition 1, we know that:
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(a) For every k 2 (0; 1), there always exists an (k) such that (k; ) is strictly de-
creasing for all  2 ((k); 1).
By proposition 3, we know that the following property holds true:
(b) For any k0; k1 2 (0; 1) such that k1 > k0 and every  2 (0; 1) ; (k1; ) < (k0; ).
Now, let:
 (k0) be the value of  when k = k0;
 (k0; (k0) be the value of (; k) when k = k0 and  = (k0);
 0(k0; ) and 0(k1; ) respectively denote the values of 0() when k = k0 and k = k1,
where 0() is dened in proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Impact of a variation in  on the size and the position of the truthtelling region in the
case of conicts of interest (left panel) and no conicts of interest (right panel).
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